tions. Agents in the model form expectations using this true distribution, conditioning on information sets that consist of all information in the model dated t and earlier. It is well documented that people do not actually behave this way, and in the literature on behavioral finance there is some suggestion that deviations from this standardized assumption of rational behavior given a common probability distribution may be important.
The recent events in financial markets -the dotcom boom, the US house price boom, perhaps the continuing commodity price boom -look to some observers like bubbles that must have fed off some sort of irrational behavior. Many observers think that monetary policy might have somehow fueled these bubble-like episodes in asset markets. These are important questions for monetary policy, and it is disturbing that the monetary policy models in use cannot even be used to pose these questions.
In this paper I focus on two particular, and related, deviations from the assumption that all agents have the same probability distribution and that they optimally process all information available up to some date t. I consider the implications of INFLATION EXPECTATIONS, UNCERTAINTY, AND MONETARY POLICY 4 needing to know the details of the mental and physical limitations that prevent people from reacting at every moment to every bit of information impinging on themwe only need to know that the limitations exist, and to make the economist's usual assumption that information processing capacity, like other resources, is used optimally. I have explored these ideas in several papers (1998; 2003; 2006) The 2003 paper shows that the theory implies modifications in the permanent income model that bring it more closely in line with observed behavior. The 2006 paper considers a two-period savings model and shows that the theory can generate discretely distributed behavior, even in the face of continuously distributed information. By now a number of other economists have taken up these ideas, including Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2005) and Matȇjka (2008) , who show that some of the observed puzzling facts about microeconomic price behavior can be explained in the rational inattention framework.
In addition to its ability to predict sluggish, noisy, and discontinuous reactions of rational agents to information, rational inattention theory suggests that they will have persistent differences of opinion, due to the fact that they are all economizing, in different ways, on their use of information.
III. CAN MONETARY POLICY FUEL SPECULATION?
Savage's axioms for decision-making under uncertainty imply that a rational economic agent making decisions under uncertainty will act as if he is maximizing expected utility under some probability distribution over the uncertain states of the world. But nothing in these axioms implies that every rational agent must have the same probability distribuiton over uncertain states. There is relatively little economic theory that considers the case where opinions, in the sense of probability distributions over states, differ. One reason for this neglect is that if people start with differing opinions, but view the same stream of evidence and process it optimally, their opinions will tend to converge. Differing opinions are thus seen as rare, one-time situations, not characteristic of a dynamic, stochastic, steady state. But the rational inattention theory we have discussed above provides a rationale for something we all know to be true: in the stochastic steady state we actually live in, the real world, there are lots of differences of opinion.
Rationally inattentive people in a stochastically evolving environment who have the same flow of data available to them at no cost will have persistently differing opinions for two reasons. One is that, even if they have the same objective functions and constraints, they can have unrelated signal-processing error. The error in their implicit signals means that their actions and opinions contain a random component at every date, and thus that their beliefs will differ. The theory does not imply that this must be true; it implies only that there will be processing error. It could be identical across individuals, or it could be completely independent across individuals. It seems likely that neither extreme is usually correct, that people filter and simplify their information streams in part through common mechanisms -reading news sources, imitating what others are doing -but also in part idiosyncratically.
The idiosyncratic part will lead to persistent differences in probability distributions across agents. Perhaps more important is that not all data is equally useful to everyone. People contemplating taking out a fixed rate mortgage will likely follow news about interest rates closely around the time of the transaction, while people living in houses with paid-up mortgages and living off social security payments might easily totally ignore news about interest rates, even though the information would be of some value to them -it might simply not be valuable enough to displace attention paid to other aspects of life.
Rational inattention is not the only reason for differences of opinion, though. In periods where genuinely new phenomena are arising, or when policy seems to be on a new and upredictable path, the argument that a long history of repeated observation leads to agreement loses its force. For example in the period 1975-2000, the wide swings in US fiscal policy (discussed below) could easily have led to differing views about the implications of those swings for future inflation. And in the late 90's in the US, when unemployment and interest rates stayed persistently low, there were differences of view even among specialist economists about the long term implications for the inflation rate.
It is sometimes suggested that low interest rates in the US fueled the dot-com boom in the stock market, the house price boom, the recent commodity price boom, or all three. It seems impossible to support this suggestion in a standard equilibrium model with rational agents, except by assuming some form of irrationality or friction in the market. In a standard model, the monetary authority controls only the evolution of the price level. If the model has no money illusion and flexible prices, the monetary authority has little or no influence over real activity. Its actions control the nominal interest rate and the path of the price level, not any real asset price.
There are some theoretical models that study markets in which agents with differing opinions interact. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003a) provides a useful survey.
The idea that differences of opinion can raise asset prices, at least if short sales are not possible, goes back at least to Miller (1977) . Harrison and Kreps (1978) showed that this result holds in a dynamic model in which agents have no risk aversion and in which short sales are not possible. Wahhaj (1999) showed that when short sales are possible and agents are risk-averse, the classic result no longer holds in general.
Recently Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) have studied irrational beliefs based on money illusion (i.e. a difference between "true" beliefs and those held by borrowers) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003b) have studied a model in which difference of belief emerge from the documented psychological tendency for people to exaggerate the precision of their own beliefs. Of these papers, only that of Brunnermeier and Julliard considers monetary policy explicitly, and they find an effect of monetary policy by postulating simple money illusion.
Here we develop a model in which no agent has money illusion, markets are frictionless, short sales are allowed, real investment produces returns according to a non-stochastic production function known by all, and nonetheless differences of opinion about the course of inflation generate overinvestment in the real asset. The mechanism is fairly easy to understand once it is laid out. Suppose one group of agents believes that inflation is likely to be high and the return on nominal bonds therefore low. Another group believes that inflation is likely to be lower. Both face the same real return on investment, which depends on the aggregate level of investment. The return on real investment in equilibrium must match what each agent sees as the expected discounted return on the risky bonds. Since they agree on the return on real investment, it must be that the agent who expects low inflation wants to hold a lot of bonds, perhaps even lending to (i.e. buying nominal bonds issued by) the other agent. He may also want to sell the stock short. He will need a portfolio of this sort so that he perceives the high expected return on bonds as being offset by the fact that they are highly correlated with his total portfolio return, justifying a risk premium on them. The other agent, on the other hand, perceives selling bonds and borrowing from the first agent as a source of cheap capital to invest in the real asset. Because of the cheap source of capital, the second agent will, if he is not very risk averse, invest more in the real asset than he would if all agents shared his beliefs, and indeed so much more that the economy's total investment is higher than it would be if all agents shared the same beliefs. This all occurs only because of the heterogeneity of opinions. If all agents in this model have the same beliefs about monetary policy, whatever the beliefs may be, the amount of real investment is invariant to their beliefs.
Because the model is meant only to make a point, not to be quantitatively realistic, it is extremely simple. Agents live two periods. They each begin life with an endowment of nominal bonds B 0 , and in the first period of life they each have a endowment Y of goods. They can consume in the first period, and the amount of their consumption is C 1 . They can finance their first period consumption and their investment S in the real asset from their real endowment or by selling some of their bonds. They can also purchase more bonds.
There are two types of agents i = a, b. There are two possible states of the world in the second period, states j = f , m. In the f state, the tax backing for bonds is low, and hence prices are high. In the m state taxes are high and prices are therefore lower.
The problem of the agent of type i can therefore be written as
(1)
Here ρ is the rental price of capital in the second period, τ j is the lump-sum tax rate in the second period in state j, and δ is the profit dividend. We think of both types of agents as being endowed with half the ownership rights in the technology, so they get dividends from the pure profits of the representative firm that are unaffected by the amount of capital they set aside in the first period to rent out in the second.
Because this mode has to be solved numerically, we assume specific, convenient functional forms for U and the production function: U(C) = C 1−σ /(1 − σ) (with log C as a limiting case as σ → 1) and g(S) = S 1−α . Profit maximizing representative firms will then require
The government fixes R, the gross nominal interest rate, as well as
Its second period budget constraints are
The government does no taxing, spending, or debt sales in the initial period, so market clearing requires 2B 0 = B a + B b .
The first-order conditions for the agents lead to
∂B :
These equations, though I think not soluble analytically, are numerically tractable.
To make this section's main point, I display two solutions, differing only in that in one p a = p b = .5, so beliefs are the same across the two types of agent, while in the other p a = .3, p b = .7, so the type a agent believes it is more likely that the tax backing for the debt will be strong, and inflation therefore low, while the type b agent beliefs the probabilities are the reverse. The parameters that stay the same across the two solutions are shown in Table 1 The two solutions are shown in Table 2 . Note that the total real investment in the solution with differing opinions is.96, while in the symmetric solution it is .88. Observe also that when opinions differ, there is a great deal of borrowing and short selling, with the agent who thinks nominal bonds are the better investment buying the entire intial stock from the other agent, and then lending him nearly as much again. The agent who thinks real capital the better investment buys promises to pay the capital return in an amount more than triple the actual amount of capital, while the other agent short sells a large amount of capital. This pattern, in which differences of opinion lead to large amounts of short selling and lending, is robust. The finding that differences of opinion about real interest rates lead to excess investment in real capital depends on the low value of σ we have chosen. To get this result, we must have agents who want to buy more capital when they perceive its return is reelatively high. If σ > 1, Agents who perceive a high return reduce their current saving, and indeed in that case differences of opinion about real bond interest rates, while still leading to large amounts of lending and short selling, reduce rather than increase investment in real capital. The log-utility boundary case These exercises are not meant to be quantitatively realistic. Most economists think that asset market behavior suggests that investors tend to have σ > 1, for example.
However in this model, real capital is the only way to generate future income. If we had a more realistic model, with many types of investment good, large proportional changes in investment in any one good could be financed with smaller changes in bond holdings. This might make the low risk aversion in this example a better approximation. Also, the case where differences of opinion about bond returns lead to decreases in real investment might correspond to a situation that is perceived as speculative excess. Though the total amount of real investment is reduced, this happens, under high risk aversion, because all the investment is being done by the agent who sees bond returns as low; that agent's investment is much higher than it would be in the symmetric equilibrium. In fact the total investment is only lower because this type of agent, being risk averse, holds back due to the risky leveraged position his portfolio puts him in.
The point here is that the notion that some aspect of monetary policy might be related to distorted speculative excess in asset markets does not rest on invoking imprecise notions of asset market imperfection or irrationality of agents. Agents with differing views of probabilities will use asset markets to bet against each other, and in the process can push real allocations in directions that would not have arisen if either agent's belief were common across all agents in the economy.
IV. A VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE PHILLIPS CURVE
The original observation by Phillips simply noted an empirical regularity: unemployment and inflation tended to be inversely related. This observation came at a time when Keynesian macroeconomic theory had a very simple and incomplete model of inflation. Keynesian theory treated wages as, if not fixed, then on an exogenously given time path. It was a theory of how nominal aggregate spending determined the level of output and employment, so long as supply-side limits on output and employment were not encountered. It was recognized that when aggregate demand exceeded supply-side limits, the result would be inflation, but the standard Keynesian theory had a discontinuity at the point where output hit "capacity", and it had no quantitative predictions about the determination of the level of inflation once capacity limits were hit.
As This is interesting, because we know that Lucas and Rapping in a series of papers in the late 60's and early 70's (1973; 1969b; 1969a) This theory sidesteps the Lucas critique, because it contains expectations explicitly and assumes that expectations are rational. But the Lucas critique is only one special case of a generic problem we face in econometric modeling: we make simplifications and approximations that we realize are contingent, so that some kinds of changes in policy, or in the nature of exogenous disturbances, will force us to change the model.
The NK Phillips curve is clearly unstable under some kinds of policy change -indeed under exactly the same kinds of policy change that the Lucas critique claimed could undermine old Keynesian models. Though the agents in the NK model have rational expectations and no money illusion, the theory has simply moved the nonneutrality from agent behavior itself into the constraints the agent faces, the frictions. The NK theory gives a central role not to unemployment, but to the output gap.
Recently the empirical literature (Sbordone, 2003), e.g., has recognized that the output gap is actually important in the theory because it measures marginal cost, and has moved toward more direct measures of this, in particular to looking at the labor share of output.
It is reasonable then, to ask whether we have any evidence on this issue: to what extent is some version of a Phillips curve central to the determination of inflation?
In an earlier, related paper 2008a I showed that structural VAR estimates of fairly strong effects of monetary policy on real activity, prices, and wages do not appear to be mediated by the marginal cost variable most commonly used in the recent NK Phillips curve literature, the share of labor in total costs. This does not suggest that the NK Phillips curve is refuted, or that it should not appear in the DSGE models where it is widely used. Indeed, it may play an important role in explaining why consumption good prices respond considerably more slowly to a monetary contraction or expansioin than do wages or commodity prices. But thinking of monetary policy as acting on inflation by first changing some measure of real tightness, like labor share, then affecting prices, seems to be missing the central part of the story.
VI. INFLATION-DETERMINATION WITHOUT A PHILLIPS CURVE
If we cannot rely on a single Phillips-curve like equation to organize our thinking about inflation, what is the replacement? There are two main directions to pursue, I think. One, already mentioned above, is to explore theories about deviations from the simple rational expectations paradigm. This may help us understand not only price stickiness and non-neutrality, but also sluggishness and inertia in economic behavior more generally. The other, which can be fruitfully pursued even within the rational expectations framework, is to be more explicit and systematic in taking a full dynamic general equilibrium approach to macro modeling, and in particular to model more carefully the interaction of monetary policy with asset markets and the interaction of asset markets with "the real economy".
Current and expected future fiscal and monetary policy have immediate and strong impacts on asset markets. In a fully articulated dynamic equilibrium model with rational agents, these impacts involve invoking transversality conditions. I have a colleague who interrupts every discussion of this kind of model with "Is this going to involve transversality conditions?". His view is that few if any economists really understand transversality conditions (which is also my view) and that it is therefore unreasonable to entertain models that invoke transversality conditions to explain the behavior of actual human beings.
But transversality conditions apply even to less-than-hyperrational agents. They are really just a name for wealth effects. If monetary policy raises the rate of return on government bonds, and if agents project that this rise in the relative return of government paper will be persistent, government paper becomes more attractive, people will tend to trade other assets for government paper, and there will therfore be downward pressure on the rate at which government paper trades for other goods -i.e. the price level. But there are conditions under which a rise in interest rates on government bonds, generated by the central bank, will not lead bond-holders to believe in persistently higher returns on government bonds. Higher real returns are possible, in general equilibrium, only if increased primary surpluses emerge in response to the higher interest rates. In an economy in which political economy or bureaucratic inefficiency makes increased primary surpluses impossible, the higher interest rates will only generate an increased rate of issue of government paper, with no increased rate of return -indeed with capital losses for holders of long nominal debt. It may take some time for bondholders to appreciate the nature of these fiscal dynamics, so that the inflationary effects of increased interest rates do not take hold immediately. But this only makes the real value of the outstanding debt at current prices increase more rapidly, so that when the realization that the increased debt has no real backing sinks in, the eventual effects on demand are even larger. This kind of situation is widely acknowledged to have existed in some countries and some time periods, especially where interest expense has become a large fraction of the total government debt and nominal interest rates are high.
Most macroeconomists, though, think of this type of scenario as applying perhaps to Brazil in some periods, but not to the US, ever. My view is that we should reevaluate this possibility. Our recent history of a stock market boom, a housing price boom, then a commodity price boom and a decline in the value of the dollar, may be best understood as reflecting the evolution of thinking by bondholders about current and future US monetary and fiscal policy. In the 1970's when the US had its great burst of inflation, fiscal policy was by some measures much more unstable than monetary policy. On average over time any country that can issue debt must be running primary surpluses -the conventional surplus plus interest payments. Rational inattention implies that people will behave as if they are observing market signals with error, and that agents with a bigger stake will invest more of their capacity in precise observation of a given signal. It therefore provides one rationale for why economic agents might have different probability distributions over the state of the economy, and for why they might persist despite the accumulation of "freely observable" evidence. Rational inattention and differences of opinion both may be related to why it is so hard, and yet so important, to model the interaction of asset markets with monetary policy and with the economy. Hard as it may be to model how a set of rational agents with a single probability distribution would have modeled the future of fiscal policy in the 70's and 80's, it is harder still to imagine that every agent, whether he held bonds or not, whether she was 75 years old or 23, whether she was thinking of taking out a mortgage to buy a first home or had lived in the same house for 40 years and paid off her mortgage, had the same views about the future of fiscal policy and, therefore, the values of nominally denominated assets. Differences of views, learning, and rational inattention might explain why the interaction of monetary policy and fiscal policy with asset markets seems sometimes to work itself out on a long time scale. Not everyone will make the same assessment, at the same time, of the implications of transversality conditions. It may be that this can lead to wide swings in asset markets, and to delayed and unpredictable effects of monetary policy shifts.
Recognition that diverse opinions about the course of the price level can be important, and that agents display rational inattention, has some immediate implications, it seems to me, about central bank communications with the public. On the one hand, rational inattention theory suggests that when monetary policy has been going well, one of its benefits is that people will pay little attention to it -and therefore may misperceive or ignore policy changes. This is a benefit because attention is a scarce resource. I think it likely that one of the main costs of high and variable inflation is that it forces people to spend a considerable fraction of their limited information-processing capacity on tracking the price level and the exchange rate.
Thus it is not a problem that the public pays little attention to monetary policy, most of the time. But there may be periods when policy has to change, and misperception of the change by the public could be costly. Rational inattention theory suggests that people will, no matter how information is presented to them, find ways to process it optimally. They will, therefore, try to be sure that they pay attention to monetary policy when it is important, perhaps relying on the services of information filters like newspapers (or, these days, internet news sites). But they will not be able to do this unless the information is there. It is a mistake, therefore, to take the evidence that in quiet times people ignore or misperceive monetary policy pronouncements as a reason to limit the flow of information about monetary policy.
This conclusion is amplified when we recognize that diversity of views about future monetary and fiscal policy can be a source of distortions of the behavior of real asset markets. If agents are forced to infer monetary policy from the time series of policy rate changes and from terse and cryptic summaries of the rationale for the rate changes, they will introduce their own signal processing errors and thereby make diversity of views more likely. The ideal communication strategy might then be multi-tiered. Very detailed and analytical descriptions of policies and the changes in it like those produced in the inflation reports of inflation-targeting central banks might be accompanied by more easily tracked simplified characterizations of policy.
The point of the simplified presentations is not to hide detail from the public, but to shape the simplified view that the public is bound to form, even if given the detailed information flow. It is worthwhile to try to move the public toward a common simplified view of monetary and fiscal commitments, rather than having them form views idiosyncratically and then bet with each other in asset markets.
